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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ERNEST JOPES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY RECREATION BOARD, Case No. 8702 
JUNIOR CHAMBER OF C 0 M-
MERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
MEADOW BROOK GOLF CLUB and 
JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND JOSEPH MICHAEL RILEY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We cannot agree in full with the statement of facts 
set forth in appellant's brief, and we submit the follow-
ing by way of modification and supplementation: 
Appellant apparently attempts to leave the impres-
sion that Meadow Brook Golf Course is operated by 
the County in competition with golf courses operated 
by private enterprise for pecuniary profit. He states 
on page 2 and again on page 12, of his brief that the 
cour.se is operated precisely the same as any private 
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course In the city. We find no evidence in the record 
to support this statement. In fact there is no evidence in 
the record as to manner of operation of any other golf 
course in Salt Lake County. 
We believe that it is a matter of such common 
knowledge that this court can take judicial notice, that 
the only golf courses in Salt Lake County .are those oper-
ated by the County itself; or by Salt Lake City, a muni-
cipal corporation; or private courses where play and 
use of the facilities is limited to the members of the 
private club and their guests. There are no golf courses 
in Salt Lake County, and so far .as we know, there are 
few if any golf courses in the entire country operated 
by private enterprise for pecuniary profit, except as 
such courses may be incidental to a large resort or 
amusement area such for example as Sun Yalley, Idaho 
or the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs. 
It is apparently suggested in appellant's brief that 
golf lessons are given by the County. This also is in-
coJ.~rect. Golf lessons are given by the defendant Riley 
as part of his duties .as the professional at the golf 
course. However, the fees paid for such lessons belong 
to him, and are part of his compensation for serdces 
rendered (Ex. 24-P, par. -±(c)). 
Appellant, at page -1 of his brief, refers to the lease 
agreement between Salt Lake County and Jessie Smith, 
the operator of the restaurant .at the club house. This 
agreement is evidenced by Ex. 25-P which was offered 
in evidence hy appellant but was not received. Since 
appellant does not here cmnplain of any error in the 
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court's failure to receive it in evidence, it is not before 
this court, on this appeal, for any purpose. 
Appellant would have the court believe that bec.ause 
a portion of the club house premises was leased to Mrs. 
Smith for her pecuniary profit, that the operation of 
the entire golf course became an operation for pecuniary 
profit. It is common knowledge that in practically all 
public parks, concessionaires oper.ate rides, games, 
amusement devices of various type.s, and refreshment 
stands on a concession basis for pecuniary profit, from 
the governmental agency owning and operating the park. 
This does not make the operation of the park any the 
less a governmental function. 
Appellant also failed to make note of the fact that 
holding of the Utah Open Golf Tournament at the 
lVIeadow Brook Golf Club not only did not financially 
benefit the County in any way, but actually was a fin-
.ancial detriment. Because the course was being used by 
the tournament players, the County lost the green fees 
which otherwise would have been paid by members of 
the public for the use of the golf course during the 
period of the tournament. The entry fees for the players, 
gallery fees paid by spectators, and other income from 
the tournament did not go to the County, but, after 
payment of the expenses of the tournament, the excess 
of the income was divided among the sponsoring organi-
zations (R. 235, 255 to 257, 296). 
The right to hold one men's open or .amateur tourna-
ment on the golf course each year was guaranteed by 
Riley's contract of employment with the County (Ex. 
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24-P, R-232, 245). It was £n the nature of a further con-
sideration to Riley for hu services, .since it was in no 
wise a benefit to the County (R. 232). 
The club house itself was built about 1950 by con-
version for use as a club house of a building previously 
erected. The concrete abutements .along the passageway 
where plaintiff fell, and, in fact, along the entire east 
wall of the club house, were part of the original building, 
and were left there when the building was converted to 
a club house (R. 247). None of the defendants in this 
action had anything whatsoever to do with their place-
mrnt. 
It is undisputed that a score board for use in the 
Utah Open Tournament, was erected on the outside 
portion of the east wall of the club house which was 
opposite to the passageway from the pro-shop to the 
dining room (R. 260-261). It is also admitted that the 
score board occluded a portion of the sunlight which 
otherwise would have passed through the glass bricks 
into the passageway. However, the evidence is clear and 
conclusive that there were other sources of light, which 
made the abutements in the passageway visible to users 
thereof (R. 248, 271, 29-!, 300-301, 302-303, 306-308, 313-
314). 
The defendant Riley testified that there was ample 
light in the hall with the score boards up (R. :2-!S, 271). 
Carman l{ipp, an officer of the defendant Salt Lake 
Junior Chamber of C01umerce, testified that there was 
light enough to see where you were going. He testified 
as follows: 
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"Q. And, from your observation being in 
there, could you tell us what that condition of 
light was~ 
"A. Well, you could see in there; it wasn't 
as bright as outside, but it was light enough to 
see where you were going. There were various 
sources of light letting in, and I didn't have any 
trouble seeing in there. 
"Q. Did you observe whether or not there 
was light coming into the passageway from the 
cafe area"! 
"A. Yes, there was. 
"Q. Did you observe whether or not there 
was light coming into the passageway from the 
golf club area~ 
"A. Yes, there was; those two doors, as I 
recall it, were open during the time that this was 
all going on during the daytime; all were kept 
open." (R. 294) 
Edward J. Whitney, another Junior Chamber Offi-
cer testified that there was light from both ends of the 
passageway and that the abutements were clearly visible 
(R. 300-1). 
Kenneth J. Done, Executive Secretary of the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce, testified that during the running 
of the tournament he passed through the passageway 
about twenty-five times a day; that there was nothing 
unusual about the lighting conditions, and that there was 
"plenty of light to see by," and that he saw the abute-
ments (R. 302-3). 
Jack Gilbert, an officer of Meadow Brook Golf Club, 
testified that he traveled through the pa.ssageway a dozen 
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times a day during the tournament; that there was noth-
ing unusual about the lighting conditions; that there was 
light in the passageway from both ends, and from the 
adjacent card room, and that he had no difficulty in 
seeing the abutements when passing through the pas-
sageway after dark (R. 306-8). 
Sidney Nelsen te.stified that on the night of the 
Calcutta Drawing, he traversed the passageway with-
out difficulty (R. 313-314). The night before, plaintiff 
himself passed through it without difficulty (R. 169, 
171). 
Although the plaintiff passed through the passage-
way five or six times prior to the accident, he never 
noticed the abutements (R. 118, 167, 177). At the time 
of the accident, he had been inside a sufficient length 
of time, according to hi.s own testimony, to permit his 
eyes to become accustomed to the difference between 
the inside and outside light (R. 184). However, when 
he was asked directly why he didn't see the abutement, 
he admitted that he didn't know (R. 178). His exact 
testimony was as follows: 
"Q. And why, if you ean tell us, didn't you 
see these large cen1ent abuten1ents T 
"A. That is what I ·would like to know." 
(R. 17S) 
At no place in his testinwny did he claiin that he tripped 
over the abuteinent because he w.as unable to see it. 
It was stipulated by counsel for the plaintiff that 
if Glen T. James, Auditor of Salt Lake County, were 
called ns a witness he would testify in accordance with 
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his answers to interrogatorie.s previously filed. These 
show that during the years 1954, 1955 and 1956, the 
gross income from the oper.ation of the Meadow Brook 
Golf Course to the County was respectively, $30,579.75, 
$32,522.10, and $36,314.50. During the year 1956, costs 
of operation were $50,309.11. For preceding years, de-
tailed records of costs of operation were not available 
but were estimated to be approximately the same as for 
1956 (R. 80). In short, the operation of the golf course 
resulted in an annual deficit to the County of from .about 
$14,000 to $18,000. It was not in anywise a profitable 
venture to the County. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the 
defendant Salt Lake County moved for a directed verdict 
on the following grounds: 
1. That as a body politic and governmental unit, 
Salt Lake County w.as immune from tort liability for 
damages for personal injuries (R. 281). 
2. Even if Salt Lake County may be liable in tort 
for d.amages for personal injuries, the operation of a 
golf cour.se is a governmental and not a proprietary 
function, .and therefore the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity applies (R. 282). 
3. There was no evidence of any negligence on 
the part of the defendant Salt Lake County (R. 282). 
4. There is no evidence that the accident was caused 
by any negligence on the part of the defendant Salt 
Lake County (R. 282). 
5. Plaintiff's own evidence showed that as .a mat-
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ter of law he was guilty of contributory negligence (R. 
282). 
The defendant J. M. Riley moved for a directed 
verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence of 
negligence on his part, that there was no evidence that 
the accident was caused by any negligence on his part, 
and that plaintiff was guilty of negligence .as a matter 
of law (R. 282-283). 
The court reserved ruling on the motions, but at 
the conclusion of all of the evidence, the motions were 
renewed, and after extensive argument to the court, the 
motions were granted. 
STATEMENT OF POIXTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS AN ARM OF THE STATE 
AND AS SUCH IS VESTED WITH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 
AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION, 
CANNOT BE SUED IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE IN TORT 
FOR PROPRIETARY ACTS, THE OPERATION OF A PUBLJ.C 
GOLF COURSE IS A GOVERNMENTAL AND NOT A PRO-
PRIETARY FUNCTION, AND THEREFORE THE DOc-
TRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY APPLIES. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE OPERATION OF A PUBLIC GOLF COURSE 
IS DEEMED TO BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF 
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
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POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS 
·CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ANY 
OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT V. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW . 
.ARGUMENT 
We recognize of course, that on this appeal the evi-
dence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. How-
ever, there is a presumption in favor of the regularity 
and validity of all proceedings in the court below. The 
motions for directed verdict, were based upon multiple 
grounds. If these respondents are correct on any one 
of their points, the judgment below should be affirmed. 
We shall undertake to demonstrate that respondents 
were correct in each and all of their points. 
POINT I. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS AN ARM OF THE STATE 
AND AS SUCH IS VESTED WITH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 
AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION, 
CANNOT BE SUED IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
Without even taking the trouble to examine the 
constitutional differences between Counties on the one 
hand, and cities and towns on the other, and without 
even a passing reference to Utah decisions dealing with 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as applied to Coun-
ties, appellant would summarily tear away the distinc-
tion which has heretofore existed, .and place counties in 
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the same category as cities, and other municipal corpor-
ations, as regards the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Although appellant has quoted copiously from the de-
cisions of other jurisdictions in an effort to persuade 
this court to put aside its well established rule, he has 
ignored the Utah precedents on this very subject. Before 
so lightly setting aside a rule so long and well estab-
lished, we believe it appropriate to examine into its 
origin, and the validity of the bases upon which it rests. 
A helpful basic discussion appears in 14 Am. Jur., com-
mencing at page 215, Counties, Sees. 48 and 49. \Ve quote 
the more illuminating portions: 
"Sec. 48. Generally.-It is well settled that 
since counties are organized for public purposes 
and charged with the performance of duties as 
arms or br~nches of the state government, they 
are never to be held liable in a private action 
for neglect to perform such duties, for acts done 
while engaged in the performance of such duties, 
or because they are not performed in a manner 
Inost conducive to the safety of employees or 
the public. unless such liability is expressly fixed 
by statute. The fact that counties are declared 
by statute to be Inunicipal corporations does not 
change the rule in the absence of anything in 
the statute imposing any additional liability. 
~loreover, no Ile'Y liability for torts is imposed 
upon a county by state Inaking it a municipal 
corporation for exercising the powers and dis-
eharging the duties of local governn1ent and ad-
Ininistering public affairs, and providing that ac-
tions for dmnages for any injury to property or 
rights for wltieh it is liable shall be in the name 
of the county. * * * 
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"Sec. 49. Reason for Rule of N onliability.-
The principal ground upon which it is held that 
counties are not liable for damages in actions 
for their neglect of public duty is that they are 
involuntary political divisions of the state, cre-
ated for public purposes connected with the ad-
ministration of local government. They are invol-
untary corporations, because created by the state, 
without the solicitation or even the consent of 
the people within their boundaries, and made de-
positaries of limited political and governmental 
functions, to be exercised for the public good, in 
behalf of the state, and not for the:mselves. They 
are in fact no less ,than public agencies of the state, 
invested by it with their particular powers, but 
no power to decline the functions devolved upon 
them, and hence, are clothed with the same im-
munity from liability as the state itself. In other 
words, the rule of nonliability for tort.s is dictated 
by public policy. Since a suit against the County 
is in effect, a suit against the state, an action 
will not lie without the consent of the legislature." 
See .also the discussion in 38 Am. Jur., commencing 
at page 260, ~[unicipal Corporations, Sec. 571, et seq.: 
"Sec. 571. Generally-It was well settled at 
common law that a mere territorial subdivision, 
such as a county or a hundred, was not liable 
for the negligence of its officers. Such a body, 
while it in a certain sense constituted a legal 
entity, was not considered a municipal corpora-
tion. * * * 
"In this country, all territorial subdivisions 
created by the state and having the power to 
assess and collect taxes are so far quasi corpor-
ations as to be liable to be sued, but a mere ter-
ritorial subdivision such as a county, township, 
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or district performing only governmental func-
tions and having no right of self government or 
private or proprietary interest is not ordinarily 
liable to actions of tort, in the absence of statu-
tory provi~ion. * * *" 
"Sec. 573. - Basis and History. - Following 
the decision in Russell v. Devon County, it be-
came a settled principle of the common law that 
an individual could not maintain an action against 
a political subdivision of the state for injury re-
sulting from negligence in the performance of 
any governmental function. The municipality was 
but a hand of the sovereign, and it was the 'right 
divine of kings to govern wrong.' Thi.s principle 
today is but a rudimentary survival of the maxim 
'The King can do no wrong,' and immunit~~ is still 
based on the theory that the sovereign cannot 
be sued without its consent, and that a designated 
agency of the Sovereign is likewise immune. The 
rea.son frequently assigned in the earlier cases was 
that the principle which holds that it is better 
for the individual to suffer than the public to be 
inconvenienced is stronger than the conflicting 
principle that for every injury the law gives a 
remedy. The later cases more often support the 
rule of govermnental inm1unity on the ground of 
a public policy which seeks to prevent public 
funds and public property from being diverted 
from publir uses and applied to the liquidation 
of private da1nages. Smne cases likewise reason 
that it would be against public policy to retard 
and stifle gratuitous governmental activities 
vitally n0cessary to the public health and welfare 
of thP population of expanding urban centers by 
subjecting 1nnnicipal corporations to tort liability 
as to parks, playgrozwds, etc." (En1phasis ours.) 
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In this state, counties are established by constitu-
tional fiat. Article XI, Sec. I, of the State Constitution 
provides as follows : 
"The several counties of the Territory of 
Utah, existing at the time of the adoption of this 
Constitution, are hereby recognized as legal sub-
divisions of this State, and the precincts, and 
school districts, now existing in said counties, as 
legal subdivisions thereof, .and they shall so con-
tinue until changed by law in pursuance of this 
article." (Emphasis ours.) 
A relatively early Utah case, Lowry v. Carbon 
County, (Ut.), 232 Pac. 909, considered the problem here 
involved, and set it at rest until the present time. This 
court there said : 
"First, does the complaint state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action against Car-
bon County~ We are clearly of the opinion that 
it does not, .and that as to the defendant Carbon 
County, the trial court properly sustained the 
general demurrer. The law relating to the lia-
bility of counties, under circumstances present in 
this case, is so clearly stated in 7 R.C.L. at pages 
954 and 957, that no further citation of authority 
is either advisable or necessary at this time. 
" 'While a municipal corporation is liable to 
an individual in certain cases for a failure to 
discharge its corporate duties upon the ground 
that its powers have been granted at the special 
solicitation, and for the benefit of its citizens, 
and not so much to aid in the administration of 
the state government as for the local advantage~ 
and convenience, still the law is well settled that 
counties being organized for public purposes, and 
charged with the performance of duties as an an;t 
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or branch of the state government, are never to 
be held liable in a private action for neglect to 
perform a corporate duty, or for acts done while 
engaged in the performance of such duties, or 
because they are not performed in a manner most 
conducive to the safety of its employees or the 
public, unless such liability is expressly fixed by 
statute. The rule i.s dictated by public policy, and 
the fact that counties are declared by statute to 
be municipal corporations does not change it in 
the absence of anything in the statute imposing 
any additional liability. The principal ground 
upon which it is held that counties are not liable 
for damages in actions for their neglect of public 
duty is that they are involuntary political divi-
sions of the state, created for governmental pur-
po_ses, and are organized without regard to the 
consent or dissent of the inhabitants. The theory 
upon which municipal corporations proper are 
held liable in such cases is that they are volun-
tary associations, created and organized at the 
solicitation of, and with the free consent of, the 
inhabitants, under the laws of the state, and that 
the benefits accruing to the people b~· such incor-
poration compensate them for the liability. An-
other reason is that, since a county is but a polit·i-
cal subdhisiou of the state, a suit against the 
county is, in effect, a suit against the state, and 
that therefore an action zrill1wt lie without con-
sent of the Legislature. ~ ~ ~ 
.. ·It is a general .and well-established rule 
that counties are not liable at common law for 
injuries resulting frmn the negligence of their 
officers or agents. ~\nd when the law itself iin-
poses a duty' upon the board of county commis-
sioners as such, and they are not appointed there-
to hy the rounty, the ronnty will not be responsi-
ble for their breach of duty or for their non-
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feasance or misfe.asance 1n relation to such 
duty.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
In the more recent case of Bingham v. Board of 
Education of Ogden City, (Ut.), 223 Pac. (2d) 432, which 
involved a school district, rather than a county, this 
court followed the same reasoning: 
"The general law of this jurisdiction, as in 
most other jurisdictions, does not authorize ac-
tions for damages for personal injuries against 
school districts. School districts are corporations 
with limited powers, and act merely on behalf of 
the state in discharging the duty of the educating 
the children of school age in the public schools 
created by general laws. 
* * * 
"Since many of the cases relied on by plain-
tiffs deal with the liability of municipal corpora-
tions, we point out that the authorities seem to 
make a distinction between municipal corpora-
tions and what are termed 'quasi-municipal' cor-
porations. This distinction is better understood 
when consideration is given to the fact that school 
boards are created exclusively for school pur-
poses and are mere agencies of the state estab-
lished for the sole purpose of administering a 
.system of public education for which they receive 
no private or corpor.ate benefit; and that, as to 
tort liability, such agencies or authorities occupy 
a status different fron1 that of municipal cor-
porations which ordinarily have a dual character 
and which may exercise proprietary as well as gov-
ernmental functions. McQuillin on Municipal Cor-
porations, explains the distinctions as follows 
(Sec. 2775, 2d Ed.) : 
" '* * * It is pertinent to state here that thC'rP 
is a distinction between municipal corporations 
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proper and quasi-municipal corporations concern-
ing liability for torts, and that the general rule 
is that the latter is not liable for torts unless 
allowed by statute. * * * . 
" 'The immunity from liability of quasi-public 
corporations is generally placed upon the ground 
of their involuntary and public character. They 
are usually treated as public or state agencies, 
.and their duties are ordinarily wholly govern-
mental. They exercise the greater part of their 
functions as agencies of the state merely, and 
are created for purposes of public policy, and 
hence the general rule that they are not responsi-
ble for the neglect of duties enjoined on them, 
unless the action is given by statute. On the other 
hand, it is recognized that the municipal corpora-
tion proper has functions which are performed 
by it not as a mere agent of the state, but in its 
capacity as a corporation serving alone the local 
inhabitants. If the city should be regarded as a 
state agency at all times, which is frequently as-
serted without qualification by courts, there 
would exist no logical ground for holding it liable 
for damages due to negligence, since in no in-
stance i.s a state held liable under the general 
principles of law.' 
"The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case of 
Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa 81, 152 
N.\V. 12, 13, refused to declare a county liable 
for negligence in the performance of its govern-
Inental functions. There the court based its reas-
oning on the distinction between the involuntary 
and yoluntary nature of political and territorial 
divisions of the state. and said: 'Counties, unlike 
ritirs and incorporated towns. are not, as a rule, 
hPld liable for torts con1n1itted by the1n, so long 
as they are acting within the scope of their gov-
ernmental powers. They are quasi n1unicipal cor-
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porations engaged in the performance of govern-
mental functions and are not responsible for the 
neglect of duties enjoined upon them, in the ab-
sence of a statute giving a right of action.'" 
This court also quoted with approval from a Ten-
nessee case, Odil v. Maury County, 175 Tenn. 550, 136 
S.W. 2d, 500, also involving a public playground or recre-
ation place, as follows: 
" ..... 'In the present case the county w.a~ 
acting within it.s delegated power when it con-
structed this school building; and even if it be 
conceded that the opening into which plaintiff 
fell constituted a nuisance, a question unnece~­
sary for this court to determine, the defendant 
is no more liable than was the county in Tyler 
v. Obion County, et al. (171 Tenn. 550, 106 S.W. 
2d 548) supra, where the county committed a 
nuisance by dumping six or seven large piles 
of gravel or rock in the middle of the road and 
left them there overnight." 
The principle was reaffirmed in the case of Shaw 
vs. Salt Lake County, (Ut.), 224 Pac. (2d) 1037, where 
this court said : 
"Thi.s court has recognized that counties a~ 
quasi-municipal corporations partake of the sor-
ereign immunity of the State, as an arm of the 
state. In this respect they are similar to school 
districts. See Bingham v. Board of Education of 
Ogden City, (Ft.), 223 P. 2d 432." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Apparently the only Utah authority cited hy appel-
lant is the early case of Lund r. Salt Lake County, 58 
Ut. 596, 200 Pac. 510. In that ca.se plaintiff sought re-
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covery against defendant for causing or permitting con-
taminated waters to flow into his fish ponds, destroying 
his fish. Plaintiff proceeded on three theories: (1) Emin-
ent domain; ( 2) Nuisance ; and ( 3) Negligence. After 
rejecting the first two theories as unsound, the court 
rejected the third theory on the grounds that the county 
was engaged in an ultra vires act, and therefore not 
liable for the torts of its agents and employees. During 
the course of its discussion, it indicated, by way of 
dicta, that the doctrine of respondeat superior, would 
apply if the act were not ultra vires and if the county 
were a municipal corporation. \Vhat was there said was 
obiter dicta wholly unneces.sary to the decision. Such 
reasoning has since been clearly, specifically, and un-
equivocally rejected by the later Utah decisions above 
cited and quoted by us. 
In view of the firmly established Utah law, it ap-
pears unnecessary to look to the decisions of sister states 
for assistance on this point. However, appellant has 
represented that the trend of authority is toward hold-
ing counties liable in tort for damages for personal 
injur~r. Lest this court draw the unwarranted inference 
that it stands alone on this point. we call attention to 
the following recent eases fron1 other western jurisdic-
tions as illustratiYe but bY no 1neans exhausti\e, of 
' ' . 
the u1an~· authorities adhering to the s.au1e doctrine as 
Utah: 
In Hadrtt rs. Board of County Comm'rs of J!usko-
.fl<'r Couuty, Old. (Old.), 32 Pac. (~d) 9-!0, the court 
::-;aid: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
"It is well settled in this state that counties 
and townships .are merely quasi-municipal cor-
porations charged by law with certain govern-
mental and administrative functions as state 
agencies, and as such are not liable in damages 
for the negligence of the Bo.ard of County Com-
missioners or township officers, or those they are 
obliged to employ in carrying on such functions." 
In Board of Comm'rs of Harmon County vs. Keen, 
(Okl.), 153 Pac. (2d) 483, the same court said: 
"We are committed to the rule that in the 
.absence of an express statute creating a liability 
therefor, a county is not liable in a civil action 
for damages for injuries resulting from negli-
gent acts or omissions of its officers or those it 
is obliged to employ in the performance of their 
duties .as such officers or employee.s." 
To the same effect see Keesee v. Board of County 
Comm'rs of Kiowa County, (Kan.), 281 Pac. (2d) 1089. 
Although California is represented by appellant as 
adhering to the opposite rule, it does so only by express 
statute known as the Public Liability Act. So much is 
manifest from a reading of appellant's own authority 
on the subject, Dineen v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, (Cal. App.), 101 P. (2d) 736: 
"The first question to be determined upon 
this appeal is whether the respondent is generally 
liable in tort for alleged injuries growing out of 
the use and oper.ation of a superior courtroom, 
or whether the respondent's liability is predicated 
solely on the provisions of the Public Liability Act. 
*** Counties are political subdivisions of the state 
for purposes of government. Art. XI, Sec. 1, of 
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the Constitution; Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 
175 Cal. 84,167 P. 614; Reclamation District v. 
Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 154 P. 845. Coun-
ties are vested by the state with a variety of 
powers which the state it.self may assume or 
resume and directly exercise. The principal pur-
pose in establishing counties was to make effect-
ual the political organization and civil adminis-
tration of the state which require local direction, 
supervision and control, including to a large ex-
tent, the administration of public justice. * * * 
In so f.ar a.s the building involved is maintained 
for the superior courts, the respondent is acting 
as a county, in governmental capacity, perform-
ing a duty expressly imposed upon it by the state. 
* * The doctrine contended for by appellant, 
therefore, has no application. If the respondent 
is liable at all, such liability must be based on 
the provisions of the Public Liability Act." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
For a more recent California decision to the same 
effect see: 
Albraeck v. Santa Barbara County (Cal. App.), 
266 Pac. ( 2d) 8-14, \\·here the court said: 
'"Inasmuch as counties are agencies of the 
state, their functions are exclusiYely govern-
rnental. A.s such counties, they are protected by 
the doctrine of sovereign imn1unity. Dillwood v. 
Riecks, 42 Cal. App. 602, 607. lS-1 P. 35."' 
Nor does Alaba1na follow the contrary rule. Al-
though there is dicta in the case of Jones v. Jefferson 
Cmtnty, (Ala.), 89 So. 17-+, (cited by appellant at page 
t 5 of his brief) to that effed, on a rehearing of the same 
case, reported at 89 So. 177, the court said: 
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"As stated in the original op1n10n in this 
case, and as all the authorities hold, counties are 
neve-r liable as for torts of their officers, agents 
or employees in the discharge of public or govern-
mental functions, unless expressly made so by 
constitutional or statutory provisions. 
"There is a well recognized distinction be-
tween liability of counties, and that of cities or 
towns, as to these matters. Towns and cities are 
voluntary corporations, but counties are involun-
tary corporations. As was said by this court in 
the case of So. Ry. Co. v. St. Clair County, 124 
Ala., 495, 27 So. 25 : 
"' at all periods of organized government, 
territorial and state [counties] have been recog-
nized as political divisions, created and organized 
as governmental agencies or auxiliaries, to aid 
by local administration, the sovereign power, in 
promoting the general welfare within the terri-
torial limits to which they are assigned ... A 
County has been defined as an involuntary poli-
tical or civil division of the state, created by 
statute, to aid in the administration of govern-
ment. It is, in its very nature, character and 
purpose public, and a governmental agency, 
rather than a corporation. Whatever of power it 
possesses, or whatever of duty it is required to 
perform, originates in the statutes creating it, 
or in the statutes declaring the power and 
duty ... ' 
"For these reasons it is the policy of the law 
not to hold the sovereign, nor its arms or agency, 
such as counties, liable as for damages in the 
discharge of these public duties done to preserve 
the health and promote the happiness and the 
general welfare of the people in the state or 
county. In the discharge of these public .and gov-
ernmental functions by the counties, damage or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
injury may often result to the citizen in conse-
quence of the negligence of some agents or offi-
cers of the state, county, or other arm or agency 
of the government; but it is the law of the state 
and of the land that neither the state, county, 
nor other arm or agency of the government is 
liable in damages to the citizens who may suffer 
loss in consequence of such negligence, unless the 
constitution or statutes expressly so provide." 
(Emphasis our.s.) 
We caution that the decisions from other jurisdic-
tions are not necessarily helpful guides to this court. 
The counties in all of the states do not have the same 
constitutional origin, nor are they endowed by consti-
tutional fiat with the same duties, obligations and im-
munities. In many states, the county serves a function 
similar to that performed by a city in Utah. In fact, 
in large metropolitan areas, city and county governments 
have in many instances been merged. This has given rise 
to some ambiguous situations as set forth in Dineen 
v. City and County of San Francisco, supra: 
"It is appellant's theory that the superior 
court is a state court, and that the city hall in 
which the courtroom is located is a city and county 
building, and that therefore the respondent ·was 
acting in a proprietary capacity in pennitting the 
state court to occupy the courtroon1, and in that 
capacity is liable for general negligence. The con-
tention is unsound. The respondent is not only a 
city, but a cit~~ and eounty. 'Yhile the superior 
court is, in one sense, a state court, it is also a 
county court. * * * A city and county government 
partakes of the nature and has the powers and 
exerei~K·~ the functions of both a eity and county 
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* * * Although such dual organization sometimes 
presents some ambiguou.s situations, it is quite 
clear that in operating a superior court it is act-
ing as a county and not as a city. * * In so far 
.as the building involved is maintained for the 
superior courts, the respondent is acting as a 
county, in a governmental capacity, performing 
a duty expre.ssly imposed upon it by the state. 
* * The doctrine contended for by appellant, 
therefore, has no application. If the respondent 
is liable at all, such liability must be based on 
the provisions of the Public Liability Act." 
There may well be sound rea.sons in other jurisdic-
tions for tre.ating counties in the same manner as cities, 
and in holding them liable in tort for dam.ages resulting 
from negligence in the performance of what are termed 
proprietary functions. vVe submit that such reasons do 
not apply in this case. By expre.ss provision of our con-
stitution, counties exist as an arm of the state, without 
the consent or acquiensence of the inhabitants. They are 
created .as a subdivision of the state for the purpose 
of administering the state's business. All acts which 
they perform are, by definition, governmental. In this 
instance, the county was authorized to establish athletic 
fields, and other recreational facilities; to equip, main-
tain, operate and supervise the same; and to employ such 
supervisors and other employees as it deemed proper 
for the purpose. Sec. 11-2-1, U.C.A., 1953. The purpose 
of this statute is to provide wholesome recreation for 
the leisure time of the public of the county. Sec. 11-2-2, 
U.C.A., 1953. This is a provision for the health and 
welfare of the citizens which is a well recognized and 
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traditional police function, certainly governmental in its 
character. 
Appellant refers to Sec.17-15-10, U.C.A., 1953, which 
provides for presentation of claims against the county. 
We believe that appellant intended to refer to Sec. 17-4-3, 
U.C.A., 1953, providing in part as follows: 
"A county has power : 
"(1) To sue and be sued." 
It was specifically held in Shaw vs. Salt Lake 
County, (Ut.), 224 Pac. (2d) 1037, that this section was 
but a general grant constituting the county an entity to 
sue and be .sued, where it might under other applicable 
statutes or principles, properly sue or be sued; it is not 
a blanket authorization for suits to be brought against 
counties. It most certainly is not sufficient authority to 
support the bringing of this suit. 
And in Jones v. Jefferson County, (Ala.), on re-
hearing, 89 So. 177, the court said: 
"The mere fact that the statutes authorized 
suits against counties or corporations which con-
stitute arms or agencies of the government, does 
not render them liable to actions in damages in 
consequence of the torts of the agents or officers 
of such corporations." 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE IN TORT 
FOR PROPRIETARY ACTS, THE OPERATION OF A PUBLI.C 
GOLF COURSE IS A GOVERNMENTAL AND NOT A PRO-
PRIETARY FUNCTION, AND THEREFORE THE DOC-
TRINE OF SOVEREIGN Il\IMUNITY APPLIES. 
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If the court is persuaded that we .are correct in our 
Point I, there is no occasion for the court to examine 
Point II. However, in the event that the court is now 
disposed to tear away the cloak of sovereign immunity 
which has heretofore protected counties from civil lia-
bility in tort, we contend that in this in.stance the county 
was engaged in a governmental and not .a proprietary 
function, and would in any event be entitled to the bene~ 
fits of the doctrine. It is well established in this jurisdic-
tion that the operation of public parks and playgrounds 
is a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary 
function. In Alder v. Salt Lake City, (Ut.), 231 Pac. 
1002, this court said: 
"The most general test of governmental func-
tion relates to the nature of the activity. It must 
be something done or furnished for the general 
'public good, that is, of a public or governmental 
character,' such as the maintenance and operation 
of public schools, hospitals, public charities, public 
parks or recreational facilities." (Emphasis ours.) 
The court said further : 
"The maintenance of the public park and the 
presentation of the pageant on the 4th of July 
by the defendant city were clearly matters of pub-
lic service for the general .and common good, de-
signed exclusively for the social advantage, enter-
tainment, and pleas1tre of the general public; and 
from which the city could derive no benefit in its 
corporate or proprietary capacity." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The doctrine was reaffirmed in the later case of 
H1tsband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Ut. 449, 69 Pac. (2d) 491. 
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It ha.s recently been reaffirmed in Davis v. Provo City 
Corp., 1 Ut. 2d 244, 265 Pac. (2d) 415, and in Ramirez v. 
Ogden City, 3 Ut. (2d) 102, 279 Pac. (2d) 463. 
In the Davis case this court said: 
"The great weight of judicial authority is 
that the maintenance of facilities for recreation 
is a public and governmental function, inasmuch 
as parks and playgrounds are generally not oper-
ated by private corporations and there appears 
to have developed some duty on the part of the 
city to provide for parks and playgrounds. *** 
There is no competition with privately owned 
business, such a play area is generally operated 
only by city, and the operation results in no bene-
fit, pecuniary or otherwise, to the municipal cor-
poration as such but is for the use of the general 
public." (Emphasis ours.) 
Appellant seeks to derive comfort from the fact that 
a nominal charge was made by the county for the use of 
the facilities provided at the golf course. Thus green 
fees were charged to play the course, and a rental fee 
was charged for those desiring to have the use of lockers 
for storing of clothing, etc. Appellant cites in support 
of this contention Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 rt. 186, 
253 Pac. 4-±3, and Grifji1l v. Salt Lake City, 111 rt. 9±, 
176 Pac. (2d) 156. Both of those cases involved the opera-
tion of a municipal swin1n1ing pool by Salt Lake City 
wherein admissions were charged for use of the facilities. 
However, there are two very in1portant differences be-
tween the facts of those two cases, and those in the case 
at bar. In the first plaet•, in those cases it appears that 
the operation of the swiln1ning pool was actually a profit-
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able venture to the city, rendering a net profit resulting 
from the surplus of income over expenses of operation. 
That is exactly contrary to the situation here. Here, 
revenue from the golf course, has never come close to 
paying the expenses of operation. Secondly, in the swim-
ming pool cases, it appeared that Salt Lake City was 
actually in competition with private enterprise, which 
was engaged in the same business for profit. There is no 
evidence of that in this case. On the contrary, we believe 
that this court can take judicial notice that there is no 
golf course in the entire state operated by private enter-
prise for pecuniary profit. All of the golf courses are 
either operated by governmental agencies for the bene-
fit of their citizens, or else are purely private clubs whose 
facilitie.s are available only to the limited few who belong. 
In the Burton case, it was recognized that the mere 
fact that a fee was charged did not make the operation 
proprietary if it was otherwise governmental in char-
acter. This court said: 
"True it is, as suggested by counsel for the 
city, that where the municipality is clearly dis-
charging governmental functions in conducting a 
particular enterprise, or is conducting it entirely 
in the interest of the public health or welfare, etc., 
the mere fact that a fee is exacted or a charge is 
made is not conclusive against the city." 
See also 39 Am. Jur. 835, Parks, Squares .and Play-
grounds, Sec. 37, to the same effect : 
"Nor does an exaction of nominal fees or a 
charge used in defraying expenses impose liability 
upon the city in the event of an injury." 
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See also Calkins v. Newton, (Cal. App.), 97 Pac. (2d) 
523, cited and relied upon by appellant: 
"The imposition of a charge for service is not 
inconsistent with the exercise of a governmental 
function. *** Nor is the fact that the county gen-
eral hospital was operated at a profit controlling.'' 
Appellant has cited and quoted from several cases 
where the renting of a public building for private or non-
governmental u,se has been held to be proprietary acti-
vity. From these, he argues that the letting of a portion 
of the club house to a private entrepreneur for the op-
eration of a restaurant for profit, makes the operation 
of the golf course, proprietary rather than governmental 
in character. We believe that the fundamental distinc-
tion between those cases and the case at bar, is that in 
those case.s, the use was inconsistent with or irrelevant 
to the principal function of the governmental building. 
rrhus in Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23, 41 Am. 
Rep. 185, (cited in appellant's brief at page 24), a room 
in the city hall was let to a poultry association. Obviously 
a poultry association would have no ordinary connection 
with local government, and the letting of 1nunicipal office 
space for private use would appear to be engaging in 
private business. However, a restaurant is a normal .ad-
junct of a golf course, just as a lenwnade stand is a nor-
Inal adjunct of a recreation park. Nor is it a departure 
from governmental actiYity to n1ake available on a lease 
basis, restaurant facilities for those resorting to the 
eour.se. This is similar to the case of Lcfrois Y. Countp 
of lllonroe. Hi:? N.Y. 563, 57 N.E. 1~5. where the opera-
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tion of a farm in connection with the maintenance of an 
almshouse and penitentiary was held to be a mere inci-
dent to the latter functions, and therefore governmental 
in character. 
A conclusive answer to this contention on the part of 
appellant is found in the Ramirez case. There a snack bar 
was operated for profit by a private entrepreneur in the 
same building which this court held was oper.ated as a 
governmental function because for the recreation and 
relaxation of its citizens. 
Plaintiff also relies upon two golf course cases from 
foreign jurisdictions. The first is Plaza v. City of San 
1llateo, (Cal.), 256 Pac. (2d) 523. In that case the Cali-
fornia court attempted to harmonize a series of earlier 
cases in some of which various types of public recreation-
al facilities had been held to be governmental in char-
acter, while others, very similar in nature, had been held 
to be proprietary in character. The court indulged in 
some very dubious reasoning to arrive at the conclusion 
that recreational functions which served the purposes 
of public education, training for self preservation and 
good citizenship, and fostering and safeguarding public 
he.alth, were governmental functions, while the providing 
of mere amusement or entertainment was not. The lan-
guage of the court was as follows: 
''But what is the primary purpose behind each 
of them~ If any general conclusion is to be drawn 
from a consideration of the cases, it is that public 
education, tr.aining for self preservation and good 
citizenship and the fostering and safeguarding 
of public health are governmental functions, while 
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the providing of mere amusement or entertain-
ment is not. *** It must be conceded that time 
spent by a boy in summer camp is to a degree 
educational, and if nothing more, training in co-
operation and good citizenship. It is a matter of 
self preservation that all who are physically able 
should learn to .swim for who can tell when it may 
be a factor in saving not ony the life of the swim-
mer, but also the lives of others." 
Whatever may be the rule in California, the Utah 
courts have never indulged in such finely drawn reason-
ing. In the Alder case, the court cited "social advantage, 
entertainment and pleasure of the general public" as 
being governmental functions from which the city could 
derive no benefit in its corporate or proprietary capacity, 
and in the Ramirez case, maintenance of a building u.sed 
for dancing and similar social amusements was held to be 
governmental in character. It is clear therefore, that 
the California decision was based upon reasoning wholly 
contrary to the reasoning which has been announced by 
this Court in holding parks, playgrounds and recrea-
tional facilitie.s as being governmental functions. 
The case of Gorsuch v. City of Spriugfield, (Ohio 
App.), 61 N.E. (2d) 898, is equally inapplicable to the 
facts of this case. There, the incon1e fr01n the operation 
of the golf course did not go back into the general fund, 
but was maintained in a special fund and was used solely 
for capital improve1nents and operation and 1naintenance 
of the golf course. Over a three year period the golf 
course had built up a gross balance of over $5,000 after 
paying all of the PXJH'nses above 1nentioned. The evi-
dence elParl~· showed that the operation of the golf course 
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was for pecuniary profit, and that it directly benefited 
the city which maintained it. The court there said: 
"It is sufficient for the present case to say 
that if the city in the maintenance and operation 
of its municipal golf course was directly compen-
sated or benefited by growth and prosperity of 
the city and its inhabitants, .and the city had an 
election to do or omit to do the acts set forth here-
in as shown by the evidence, the function is pri-
vate and proprietary." 
The facts in the Gorsuch case were wholly different 
from those in the case at bar. Here the course has been 
operated at a deficit for the past several years and the 
nominal green fees which are charged have not been 
sufficient to pay the cost of operation and maintenance. 
The course is available for the use and benefit of the en-
tire public and is operated pursuant to statutory au-
thority set forth in Sec. 11-2-1, and Sec. 11-2-2, U.C.A., 
1953. 
l\Iore similar on its facts, and therefore Inore helpful 
in the determination of the case at bar, is Williams v. City 
of Birmingham, (Ala.), 121 So. 14. In that case, under a 
statute very similar to the statute under which defendant 
Salt Lake County operates, and maintains Meadowbrook 
Golf Course, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the 
operation of a municipal golf course for the use and en-
joyment of the inhabitants of the city, was a govern-
mental and not a proprietary function. Said the Court: 
"The park in question may be .assumed, by 
judicial notice, ... to be a public enterprise, con-
ducted by the city for the welfare of its citizens 
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and the public generally, under the Act of Sept. 
29, 1923 .... 
"Under such act the power is given the city 
to provide parks, playgrounds, recreational cen-
ters, or park areas by and through a park and 
recreation board named by the city. There is pro-
vision made for reasonable fees or charges for 
access to or use or enjoyment of any playground, 
etc., conducted by the city, to be paid into and 
become a part of the park and recreation fund of 
the city .... The board is vested with the power to 
acquire and operate for the city public parks .and 
playgrounds .... " 
After reviewing many cases involving the operation 
of public parks and playgrounds, the court concluded as 
follows: 
"There being no uniform rule in this respect 
established in the country at large, we must choose 
our own path. *** [W]e think that, to hold the 
function public and governmental, .and not merely 
corporate or ministerial, is in the spirit of the 
deci.sions heretofore rendered by this court, and 
is our idea of the correct interpretation of such 
service to the public by a city." 
Although we have discovered no other cases involv-
~ng golf courses, the foregoing decision has been cited 
with approval in many cases, of which the following are 
the most similar in their facts: 
Parr v. City of Birmingham. (Ala.), S5 So. 
2d 888; 
.Atkins v. Ci.ty of Durham, (X.C.), 186 SE 
330; 
Downey v. Jackson, (Ala..). 65 So. 2nd 8~5~ 
Commissioner of Internal Rcceuue Y. Sher-
mau, 69 Fed. (~d) 755. 
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POINT Ill. 
EVEN IF THE OPERATION OF A PUBLIC GOLF COURSE 
IS DEEMED TO BE A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION, THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF 
DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS 
·CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ANY 
OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
If the court is favorably influenced by our argument 
either under Point I or Point II, it will not need to ex-
amine Points III and IV. However, if the court rules 
adversely to us on both of the two preceding propositions, 
we further contend that there is no evidence whatsoever 
of any negligence on the part of Salt Lake County, or that 
any negligence on the part of the County (or any other 
defendant) caused or contributed to cause the accident. 
Points III and IV involve a consideration of the same 
evidence and can conveniently be discussed together. 
The evidence shows without dispute, that the club 
house w.as built around 1949 or 1950; that it was con-
verted from a pre-existing building, and that among other 
things, there were in the former building, concrete abut-
ments at regular intervals along the entire east wall. 
Although there was no expert testimony on the subject, 
it appeared that such abutments served a useful purpose 
in the structure, and they were .accordingly left there 
when the building was converted for use as a golf club 
house. The building was so designed and arranged that 
the pro-shop or golf shop was in the northerly end, and 
the coffee shop was in the central portion, and they were 
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connected by a passageway running .along the east side, 
in which one or two abutments were located at points 
within the passageway. No artificial light had ever been 
provided for the passageway from within, that is, there 
was no light or lamp of any type. within the passageway 
itself. However, the passageway was amply lighted by 
light from the golf shop, the restaurant, and the adjacent 
locker room and card room. The passageway was not a 
long one, being only .about 18 feet, a distance which the 
average person would traverse in about six steps. The 
passageway had existed in this condition for a period of 
some five to six years prior to the accident, without, so 
far as the evidence shows, any previous accident, or other 
untoward event. There is no evidence that any officer, 
.agent, servant or employee of Salt Lake County had any-
thing whatsoever to do with the design, construction, or 
conversion of the building. Whatever danger inhered 
in the concrete abutments in the passageway was not 
created by the county, and was open, obvious and patent 
to all who traversed it. 
As we see it, the only possible ground upon which the 
plaintiff can claim negligence on the part of any defend-
ant to this action, is that the passage,vay was darkened 
by the placing of the score board over the glass brick 
along the easterly wall of the building. Ad1nittedly, this 
had the effect of occluding a portion of the natural light 
which otherwise would haYe entered the passageway 
d1~rin!J daylight hours, and to that extent di1ninished the 
illumination therein. The record is extre1nely hazy at 
best, as to the proportion of the illun1ination provided by 
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artificial light and the portion provided by natural light. 
However, the record is clear, that even at night, the il-
lumination coming from rooms at either end of the 
passageway, and those adjacent thereto, was sufficient 
to illuminate it sufficiently for safe passage. 
The strongest testimony in the record in support of 
plaintiff's po.sition is the testimony of Paul Gore, to the 
effect that he stumbled over the abutment only a few 
minutes before the plaintiff's accident; that it was so 
dark in the hallway that he could not see it; and he didn't 
know exactly what he stumbled over until he felt it after 
his fall. However, Mr. Gore was a contestant in the 
tournament. Quite naturally if he had been out in the 
bright August sunlight immediately preceding the fall, 
and if his eyes had had no opportunity to adjust to the 
lighting conditions within, he would have difficulty in 
seeing. This is a perfectly natural phenomenon which 
everyone experiences in coming from bright outdoor light 
into even a well lighted room. 
On the other hand, there is an abundance of evidence 
by persons who traversed the passageway during the 
tournament during daylight hours, that there was ample 
light to see the abutments; that they did see them, 
and that they experienced no difficulty whatsoever in 
observing them. Of even greater importance, is the testi-
mony of those who traversed the passageway at night, 
including plaintiff, himself. Quite obviously the amount 
of outside light which would enter the passageway 
through the glass bricks at night would be inconsequen-
tial, even in the absence of the scoreboard. The testimony 
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is undisputed that the facilities of the club house are used 
three or four nights a week, .and had been since the club 
house was built. Person.s desiring to use the men's lava-
tory and wash room would of necessity have to proceed 
through this passageway to go there. Yet there is no 
evidence that any person had any difficulty traversing 
the passageway, including even those who might have 
their f.acultie:s somewhat impaired by indulging in alco-
holic beverages. In the face of such evidence, the testi-
mony of the witness Paul Gore, standing alone, as it does, 
falls far short of satisfying plaintiff's burden of proving, 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the erection of 
the score board was the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's accident. 
The plaintiff's own testimony shows that prior to the 
accident, he had been through the same passageway ap-
proximately half a dozen times. He had never on any of 
his several trips observed the concrete abutments. Yet, 
when he was asked directly on cross examination, why 
he didn't see the large cement .abutments, he answered, 
"That is what I would like to know." (R. 178). At no 
place in his testimony did the plaintiff state that he failed 
to see the abutment by reason of the darkness or in-
sufficient illu1nination in the passageway. He frankly 
admitted that he didn't understand why he didn't see it. 
Such testimony is certainly not sufficient to sustain 
plaintiff's burden of proof. As said in Schwartz, Acci-
dents in Buildings, page 283: 
"As in all negligence actions, the plaintiff 
1nust establish a causal relation between the exist-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
ence of a defect in the stairs or passageways and 
the injury. If the c.ause or manner of plaintiff's 
fall is not clear, a verdict in his favor will not be 
sustained." 
Even if the court should determine that a jury might 
find that it was negligence to erect the score board along 
the wall, still it was erected by Riley for his own pur-
poses, and not for any benefit of the defendant Salt Lake 
County, .and in erecting the score board, he was not en-
gaged in the course of his employment as golf pro and 
manager at the Meadow Brook Golf Course. Under 
Riley's contract of employment by the County (Ex. 24-P) 
the duties of Riley were defined in paragraphs 7 and 8. 
They were in substance, proper operation of the golf 
course; promotion of instruction; supervision, operation, 
improvement, and maintenance of the golf course, includ-
ing supervision of tee markers; treating of tees; chang-
ing of putting cups; watering of fairways; cutting of 
fairways, greens, and trees ; installation and maintenance 
of ball washers ; closing green.s when necessary; requir-
ing use of temporary greens and tees, when necessary; 
establishment of .a policy requiring play by golfers in 
groups of four or les.s ; and such other activity as would 
be reasonably necessary to maintain, operate and im-
prove the golf course, as the need appeared. He was 
further obligated under paragr.aph 8, to maintain and 
operate at reasonable prices a first clas.s golf shop, and 
to have on hand an adequate supply and variety of golf 
equipment and .accessories. These were the only duties 
enjoined upon him by his contract of employment. lie 
had no duties whatsoever in connection with the manage-
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ment, operation, or maintenance of the club house, except 
the portion thereof designated as the pro shop. In con-
sideration for the services to be rendered by him, he was 
to receive various benefits as outlined in paragraphs 1, 2, 
3, 4 ,and 5. Among these benefits were the right to act 
and advise as consultant and architect of golf courses.; to 
play in all sectional open tournaments, and to have and 
promote various tournaments at the Meadow Brook Golf 
Course, including one Men's open .amateur tournament 
each year. 
If Mr. Riley while playing in a sectional open tourna-
ment, at, for example, Ogden, had injured someone by 
driving a ball into him, we do not believe that anyone 
could reasonably claim that while so eng.aged he was 
acting for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, or that 
the county would in anywise be responsible for his acts 
under those circumstances. The same reasoning would 
apply here as well. Riley was engaged in the promotion 
of .an open tournament in accordance with the privilege 
accorded him under his contract of employn1ent. Ad-
mittedly, the score board had been prepared and erected 
for the purpose of the open tournmnent. Adn1ittedly the 
county derived no benefit fr01n the holding of the tourna-
Inent. On the rontrary, the tournan1ent \Yas a detriment 
to the county in that, during the holding of the tourna-
ment, public play was lilnited, and therefore the county 
lost the green fees which otherwise would have been 
paid. The county received no financial benefits \Yhat-
soever fr01n the holding of the tournmnent. In erecting 
the scoreboard, Hiley was arting solely in his O\Vn interest 
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and for his own purposes, and not for any purpose, ad-
vantage or benefit of the county. If he was negligent 
while so acting, such negligence is not imputable to the 
county. 
In summary, it appears: 
(a) Th.at the:re was no negligence in the design or 
construction of the club house. 
(b) There is no evidence that the county, acting 
through any of it,s duly authorized officers, agents, ser-
vants or employees, had any part in the design or con-
struction of the club house. 
(c) The placement of the score board along the 
outside wall of the club house did not materially decrease 
the illumination of the inside passageway, and there is 
no evidence from which a jury could find negligence in 
so doing. 
(d) There is in.sufficient evidence to make a prima 
facie case that the erection of the scoreboard caused, or 
contributed to cause the accident to the plaintiff. 
(e) In erecting the scoreboard the defendant Riley 
acted solely in his own interest, and not on behalf of 
S.alt Lake County, and the county is not chargeable with 
his negligence, if any, in so doing. 
Of course, points (c) and (d) establish a defense not 
only for Salt Lake County, but for all other defendants 
as well. 
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POINT V. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It is axiomatic that a person passing through a 
darkened or insufficiently lighted passageway should 
proceed with caution, commensurate with the risk in-
volved. One may not with abandon traverse a darkened 
or dimly lighted passageway with the same freedom that 
one may pass through a well lighted one, in which any 
obstructions to free passage would be readily apparent. 
If the passageway were as dark as appellant contends 
that it was, he .should have proceeded slowly .and cautious-
ly, step by step, to be certain that the footing was safe 
and sure. This is particularly true where, as here, a large 
tournament was in progress, and large crowds had 
gathered to observe the competition, and one might read-
ily anticipate that a caddy bag, box of equipment, or 
similar impediment might be left in the passageway by a 
careless or thoughtless person. 
Having traversed the passage on several previous 
occasions, plaintiff knew or should have known, of all 
that any formal notice might have given him. The un-
fortunate accident plainly resulted from plaintiff's own 
negligence, and not from the conduct of any person hav-
ing anything to do with the operation of the tournament. 
CONCLliSION 
Salt Lake County, as an .ann of the state government, 
has complete soyereign ilnn1unity, and is not liable in tort 
for dmnages in the operation of a public golf course. It 
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is engaged in a purely governmental function, that is, of 
providing wholesome recreational facilities for inhabit-
ants of the county. The county wa.s not in anywise 
negligent in the construction, operation or maintenance 
of the club house. The accident did not result from any 
negligence on the part of any defendant in this action, 
and the plaintiff was, as appears from his own testimony, 
guilty of contributory negligence. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MoREToN, CHRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
By: RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County 
and the defendant Riley. 
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